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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the neglected question of the implications for European economic and 
monetary union of divergent European housing market institutions and financing. Evidence is 
reviewed which suggests that there is little significant convergence in European housing 
finance systems and their regulation. Consequently real house prices display differing degrees 
of volatility and cyclicality across Europe with only weak evidence that there is a common 
cycle across different countries. Econometric analysis finds little evidence for any substantial 
convergence in real house prices, with a marked difference apparent between “core” 
European economies such as Germany, Italy and the Netherlands and countries such as the 
UK and Finland where owner-occupation rates are high, housing finance systems deregulated 
and real house prices volatile. This difference is also found to be apparent in the degree of 
association between real interest rates and real house prices, with stronger causal links 
evident for the latter type of economy. The importance of real house price movements for the 
macroeconomy is to be found in their impact, working through conjectured effects on 
permanent income expectations, on consumer spending activity. Once again it is countries 
such as the UK and Finland where the causal links appear strongest. This implies that the 
adoption of a single European monetary policy is likely to lead to inflationary pressures in 
countries with higher owner-occupation rates, leading to a need for corrective fiscal action or 
the re-introduction of more stringent forms of personal sector financial and housing finance 
regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The birth of the single European currency and the process of economic and monetary 
convergence, which is intended to accompany both the gestation and development of this new 
arrival, has enormous implications for economic performance and market behaviour. 
However one area, relatively neglected by economists and policy makers alike, is that of the 
impact of European monetary integration and the introduction of a common European 
monetary policy on European housing markets. The process of monetary convergence is of 
critical importance to the behaviour of European housing markets because of the lack of 
uniformity and slow rate of institutional convergence of housing finance systems among the 
member states of the EU.  
 
This paper investigates this issue by reviewing the extent of institutional convergence 
in national housing markets and by examining house price volatility across Europe and the 
relationship between house prices, interest rates and other indicators of economic activity. 
Our aims are to assess the extent of differences in house price volatility and the extent to 
which those differences can be explained by the responsiveness to interest rates and returns to 
equities, given that greater deregulation of housing finance and removal of credit rationing 
might lead to greater sensitivity of house prices to interest rates and to indicators of future 
wealth. We also aim to assess whether the linkages between consumer spending activity and 
the housing market are stronger where such deregulation has been more rapid. Our prior 
hypothesis is that the diversity of European housing finance systems, reviewed in section 2 
and documented in detail elsewhere, has led to significant differences in levels of house price 
volatility and to stark differences in the sensitivity of house prices to changes in monetary 
policy. Convergence of interest rates, without any associated reform or convergence of 
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housing finance systems, is likely to lead to a damaging divergence in rates of real house 
price inflation, but a correspondingly asymmetric impact on rates of growth of consumer 
spending in different economies. This is because interest rate differences between countries 
often compensate for the effects of other variations in tax regimes in their effect on the user 
cost of housing. In turn, therefore, interest rate convergence may risk triggering once again 
the rapid growth in personal sector debt inflation which was observed in some EU 
economies, such as the UK and Finland, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present a brief 
review of the diversity of institutional constraints on housing finance across the EU. Section 
3 presents evidence on the degree of real house price volatility and convergence for a sample 
of EU economies. Section 4 presents comparative econometric evidence on the relationship 
between real house prices and interest rates and stock market returns in order to assess the 
extent to which housing market activity is more sensitive to movements in monetary policy 
and expected income appreciation where financial regulation has been more pronounced. The 
direction of the relationship between real house prices and real consumer spending activity is 
addressed in Section 5. Section 6 presents an overall assessment and conclusions. 
 
2. Owner-Occupation Finance across the EU 
 
 The importance of owner-occupation as the dominant form of housing tenure in the 
late twentieth century is well-established across Europe. Nevertheless rates of owner-
occupation vary considerably. Table 1, columns (1) and (2) reports recent estimates of the 
relative size of the owner-occupied and private rental sectors (with social housing the 
remainder). Tenure patterns vary considerably across Europe. At one extreme Germany, with 
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38 per cent owner-occupation, has almost equally sized owner-occupier and private rental 
sectors. In the Netherlands social housing is still over one third of the total, and the owner-
occupied sector is also, relative to the rest of Europe, relatively small. In Austria, and in the 
Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Denmark households enjoy a choice between owner-
occupation, or some form of co-operative ownership or private rental tenure, although the 
majority now opt for owner-occupation.  At the other extreme Ireland, Italy, Finland and the 
UK have tiny private rental sectors, and for the vast majority of those in the middle and upper 
income ranges owner-occupation is the only tenure mode available. In Spain also the owner-
occupied sector is proportionately very large, although the absence of the development of 
sizeable social housing sector (for cultural reasons, and because of the nature of state control 
prior to the establishment of democracy in 1978) is a feature here. Consequently the private 
rental sector in somewhat larger than in the other countries where owner-occupation is highly 
dominant. 
 
Housing finance systems vary across EU member-states in many aspects and 
dimensions.1 However we can highlight four main influences; the tax treatment of capital 
gains and of imputed rental income from the housing asset; the tax treatment of housing 
investments and mortgage interest payments; the extent of credit rationing on new mortgage 
debt; and the favourableness of the prevailing tax and subsidy regime relative to other 
housing tenure modes, in particular the private rental sector. Table 1 summarises the main 
features of these influences for twelve out of the fifteen current EU member states.  
 
In most European economies capital gains and imputed income from owner-
occupation have over the last 40 years or so been treated favourably compared to most other 
                                                          
1 Maclennan  et al. (1998) provide a fuller review and discussion. 
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sources of income. France is the only country to have applied capital gains tax to owner-
occupied housing and then only to property over four times the average price. Only Spain and 
the Netherlands apply a tax on imputed rental income, but in both cases assume a very low 
imputed rate of return. In Spain this is offset by extremely generous tax treatment of housing 
investment and interest payments (see below). In some countries such as the UK and Ireland 
a 1% transactions duty (“Stamp Duty”) is payable on house purchases, and in other EU 
countries VAT is payable on new houses. The latter is generally at a reduced rate (e.g. 3-6 per 
cent in Spain), although in the Netherlands VAT at 17.5 per cent is levied on new houses. 
 
The tax treatment of mortgage interest is also generally favourable to owner-occupiers 
across Europe, although with some notable exceptions. At one extreme Germany and Austria 
provide no tax allowance for interest payments. Other countries place an upper limit on any 
tax allowance, and the case of France the allowance is only available for the first five years. 
In the UK the last two decades have seen a gradual erosion on the value of the allowance, by 
both the erosion of the real value of a nominally fixed interest on first £30,000 borrowed 
(currently less than half the average new mortgage advance) and the gradual reduction in the 
rate at which the tax relief can be claimed. The allowance is shortly to be abolished. The most 
favourable taxation regime on mortgage payments in is Spain, where not only interest 
payments can be deducted from one’s tax liability at the appropriate marginal tax rate, but 
also up to 15 per cent of the purchase investment. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that 
real estate debt in Spain has risen from 15 per cent of GDP in 1983 to 25 per cent in 1994 
(Alberdi and Levenfeld, 1996). 
 
Where rationing of new mortgage credit takes place, it is usually through the form of 
a down-payment constraint. Often this operates on a voluntary and informal basis as a result 
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of lending policies operating within the housing finance sector. So for example British 
mortgage lenders will typically advance up to 3 or 3.25 times a single annual salary, or 2.5 
times a joint annual salary on a new mortgage. In some EU countries a statutory maximum 
loan-to-value limit is imposed; in Germany and France this is set at 60 per cent, in Sweden 
and Italy at 75 per cent and in Denmark at 80 per cent. As a consequence average mortgage 
advances as a proportion of house values are lower. By contrast in the UK mortgage advances 
can easily be obtained up to 100 per cent of the current valuation, and during the late 1980s, 
when nominal house price inflation rates were high, advances over 100 per cent were 
possible for some borrowers. Financial institutions are generally able to shift the downside 
risk of falling collateral values onto a secondary insurance market. 
 
In most EU economies over the last 20 years there has been a reduction in barriers to 
entry, and an associated increase in competition in the market for the provision of housing 
finance. As the Bank of England (1991) notes this is indicative of some degree of 
convergence. However the process of removing credit rationing has been much more rapid in 
countries such as the UK and Finland (in the latter case as a result of increases in average 
loan maturity as well as lower down-payment requirements). As Table 1 shows there remains 
considerable divergence in the degree of favourableness in the tax regime facing investors in 
owner-occupied housing. 
 
A further important source of divergence across Europe concerns the relative 
availability, regulation and tax treatment of the private rental sector. Those countries where 
house prices have shown some of the fastest rises in the 1980s (and falls in the 1990s in the 
case of Finland and the UK) the private rental sector is small. This small size is arguably the 
result of long historical rent regulation, and relatively unfavourable tax treatment (for 
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landlords).  On the other hand Germany, with its relatively more stable owner-occupier 
market and associated credit constraints, has a thriving private rental sector equal to around a 
third of the total market. Private sector renters are, in contrast to most other EU economies, 
given a much more favourable treatment by the fiscal system. Owner-occupation does not 
enjoy extensive taxation protection, and rent subsidies are made available to private sector 
tenants. Acting on the supply-side of the private sector rental market in many EU economies 
are systems of rent regulation, which, while they protect those on lower incomes, reduce the 
incentives to supply rental accommodation. It can be argued that an important effect of this is 
to “push” lower income and younger households into owner-occupation. Countries such as 
the UK have largely dismantled such controls. Others such as Spain, Sweden and the 
Netherlands have reduced their severity. However these changes generally have had little 
impact on private rental supply, in the context of simultaneous deregulation in the provision 
of mortgage finance. 
 
As an overall assessment we would judge that while there are signs of some 
convergence in the institutional regulation of housing finance systems, particularly in the area 
of increased competition in the provision of finance, there is still a long way to travel before a 
conclusion of substantial system uniformity could be warranted. 
 
3. House Price Convergence in EU Economies 
 
 The rather slow rate of convergence in the institutional control of national housing 
markets across the EU would suggest that relatively little convergence is to be observed in 
rates of growth of European house prices. A small number of previous studies have examined 
the comparative behaviour of European house prices in detail. Holmans (1994) in his detailed 
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survey of comparative international housing market data concludes that a number of 
European economies all experienced substantial common nominal growth and instability in 
house prices in the 1970s. Englund and Ioannides (1997) conclude, from econometric 
analysis, that the dynamics of house price changes are quite similar across a number of 
OECD countries (including US and Japan), although evidence for a common international 
house price cycle is rather weak. 
 
Data correlation 
Figure 1 plots the annual real rate of growth in house prices for seven EU member 
states for which reasonably reliable and consistent house price data can be obtained since 
1970/71 or earlier.2 A cursory inspection would support the conclusion of Englund and 
Ioannides – there is some suggestion of a common cycle but there is considerable variation 
around it. Netherlands house prices display a very pronounced cycle in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. In other countries the cycle is apparent but less severe. In the late 1980s it is the 
UK and Scandinavia which had the common experience of large rises in house prices, 
following by subsequent substantial falls in the 1990s.3 Stephens (1995) notes that the 
Spanish experience matches this. To a lesser extent the same pattern occurs in Ireland, 
although the early 1990s collapse is not as severe. In Ireland in the late 1990s a real house 
                                                          
2 A wider sample of countries would be highly desirable, particularly with the inclusion of the 
two larger EU members, France and Spain. French data is not available on an annual basis 
until the 1980s (Holmans, 1994). Spanish data is virtually non-existent. 
3 The impact of financial deregulation and the severe cycle in the UK housing market in the 
1980s and 1990s, along with their implications for the wider economy has been investigated 
quite extensively by inter alia Carruth and Henley (1990, 1992), Miles (1992), Bayoumi 
(1993), Meen (1990), Muellbauer (1992), Muellbauer and Murphy (1997). Berg and 
Bergstrom (1995), Berg and Lyhagen (1998) and Kort (1998) undertake detailed time-series 
investigations of Swedish house prices. An analysis of the Finnish case, along with an 
investigation of the impact of housing market liberalisation on personal sector saving, is 
provided by Koskela et al. (1992). Kennedy and Andersen (1994) provide an international 
comparative investigation of the impact of house prices on personal sector saving, in the 
context of 1980s financial deregulation. 
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price boom has continued to concern economists and policy makers, fuelled by falling real 
interest rates and high rates of economic growth. 
 
For further investigation Table 2 summarises real house price movements across these 
countries by dating troughs and peaks. It is difficult from this evidence to argue in favour of a 
strongly coincident European house price cycle, at least before the 1980s. Greater 
coincidence in cycles is apparent since the mid 1980s, but the pronounced difference 
between, in particular, very stable real house prices in Germany and most other European 
countries is quite apparent from both the Table and Figure 1. 
 
Cointegration 
We now turn to a more formal econometric investigation of house price correlation 
and convergence within the EU. As a precursor to econometric analysis Table 3 reports 
Phillips-Perron unit root tests for (log) real house prices in each of our seven countries. In 
four of the seven cases (Finland, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK) the results unequivocably 
support the conclusion that real house prices are I(1). For Germany we reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity in differences at somewhere between the 5 and 10 per cent 
level. For Ireland we are able to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in differences at 
only close to the 10 per cent level. Here the explosion in house prices at the very end of our 
sample period, in conjunction with the rather short number of observations, makes for a series 
which appears close to I(2).4 At the other extreme for Italy the test results suggest the 
possibility that real house prices are I(0). However the Italian series is quite “spikey” and is 
probably the poorest quality data of the seven series. A three year smoothed series in this case 
is less “erratic” and closer to being I(1). 
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Table 4 reports the correlation matrix for the first differenced series. The strongest 
correlations are for the UK with Finland and Sweden, and for Sweden with Ireland and the 
Netherlands. Germany stands out as having very weak house price correlation growth with 
the other countries, except, perhaps, Ireland. 
  
Further analysis of correlation and convergence is provided through bivariate 
cointegration tests5 for each country against the others. Cointegration can be regarded as a 
necessary, although not sufficient condition for convergence since it implies that the 
difference between two variables does not have infinite variance (Hall et al. 1992). Results of 
this exercise, using the Engle-Granger approach, are reported in Table 5. Evidence of 
cointegration with German house prices is found for Italy and the Netherlands (at 5% 
significance or better), and some evidence (between 5 and 10% significance) for Ireland. 
Evidence of cointegration with UK house prices is found for Finland and Italy. Further 
econometric evidence is reported in Table 6, which presents results of the Phillips-Hansen 
test for a long-run relationship between real house prices. The Phillips-Hansen procedure is 
used as an alternative to Johansen multivariate analysis in providing evidence of a bivariate 
long-run relationship.  These results broadly confirm the evidence found for cointegration in 
Table 5. In addition the relationship between German and Irish house prices is much stronger 
in Table 6. There is evidence of cointegration between Netherlands and Finland, Netherlands 
and Ireland, and at the 10% level of significance only, Italy and Ireland.6 Overall this 
provides mixed and incomplete evidence for any long-run statistical relationship between real 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4  The inclusion of a deterministic trend, while not statistically significant, raises the Phillips-
Perron test statistic to –3.038, supporting the conclusion that the series is I(1). 
5 A multivariate Johansen analysis is precluded by the short duration of the time series 
available. This constraint also necessitates a strong caveat on the results reported. 
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house prices across the EU, although some evidence of convergence within a group of EMU 
economies which includes Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. This said there is also 
evidence of convergence with UK house prices. 
 
Time-varying long-run parameters 
The use of time-varying parameter techniques has recently become recognised as a 
powerful tool for analysing long-run economic convergence. This is most easily implemented 
through what has become known as the Haldane-Hall methodology (Haldane and Hall, 1991). 
The previous discussion points to the possibility of house price convergence with Germany 
(reflecting perhaps convergence within an ERM/EMU group of countries, where housing 
finance is more heavily regulated and subject to liquidity constraints). It also suggests, to the 
extent that some countries have begun to deregulate housing finance provision, the possibility 
of convergence with the UK (where housing finance has been most subject to a deregulation 
process, with a resulting lowering of liquidity constraints). In the present context, therefore, 
we are concerned with the extent to which movements in the real house price in a particular 
country, relative to either that in the UK or in Germany is associated with movements in the 
UK real house price and with movements in the German real house price. Equations 1 and 2 
summarise this: 
 
ttUKDtttiD ehphpbahphp 111 )()( +−+=−  
(1) 
ttDUKtttiUK ehphpbahphp 122 )()( +−+=−  
(2) 
 
where hp denotes real house price. Convergence of real house prices in country i with 
Germany implies b1 tends to zero and b2 to one. Convergence with the UK implies b1 tends to 
one and b2 to zero. The time-varying nature of the parameters of the process allow the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Corresponding reverse regressions in each case were estimated and the results were 
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stochastic intercept parameters to capture any systematic influences other than those working 
through the German-UK house price differential, although at the expense of any possible 
interpretation of the direction of causality. In practice it is only necessary to investigate 
empirically the time-varying behaviour of the b parameter in one of the two equations, since 
the three relative real house price variables in (1) and (2) are linked through an identity. 
 
 Estimation of equation (1) is performed using the Kalman-Filter technique (Harvey 
1987), with the stochastic time-varying parameters, a and b, assumed to evolve according to 
random walk processes. Figure 2 plots the evolution of b1 for each of the other five countries 
(Finland, Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland and Italy) over the period 1972 to 1997. Ireland, Italy 
and the Netherlands show evidence of convergence with Germany, although for Ireland 
convergence is strongest in the early 1980s at the beginning of Irish membership of the 
exchange rate mechanism. The 1990s have seen a slight drift away. Sweden also 
demonstrates slight divergence from Germany, but ends the time period well away from the 
value of one which would imply strong convergence with the UK. Finnish house prices, on 
the other hand, show a progressive drift away from Germany towards convergence with the 
UK by 1997. 
 
Assessment 
 As an overall assessment there would appear to be no strong evidence for consistent 
convergence of real house price movements within Europe, even within ERM and now EMU-
member countries. With the exception of Finland the countries in our sample appear to have 
converged closer to Germany than to the UK, but only Italy appears to demonstrate a 
significant level of convergence. Ireland appears to have enjoyed a period of close alignment 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
consistent with those reported. 
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with Germany, but this has broken down in the late 1990s as Irish nominal house prices have 
spiralled upwards. Given the variation in the institutional features of the different housing 
finance systems, as discussed in section 2, the lack of convergence over time is perhaps 
unsurprising. However this has important implications for the impact of shocks on European 
housing markets and the asymmetric impact that these will have on different EU member 
economies. We turn to this issue in the next two sections. 
 
4. Real House Prices, Interest Rates and Wealth Effects 
 
 The issue of the possible asymmetric impact of economic shocks across Europe has 
two dimensions. The first is that those shocks themselves may be of different sizes in 
different EU member economies. It is certainly the case from the evidence reviewed in 
section 3 that real house prices are more volatile in some countries compared to others, and 
that there is no strong common cycle. The introduction of a single currency and monetary 
policy and possible future harmonisation of fiscal policies ought to lead to a situation in 
which shocks are less asymmetric in their distribution. However the second dimension is that 
there may be asymmetric adjustment to a given shock across countries. One of the main 
reasons for this is to do with the differentiation of housing finance regulation and institutions. 
Consequently the responsiveness of house prices to movements in economic determinants 
may be different. 
 
 Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) discuss deregulation in the context of a standard 
intertemporal model of the household’s allocation of income and wealth resources to housing 
and consumption. They show that the removal of institutional constraints on the availability 
of housing finance will mean that house prices ought to become more responsive to real 
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interest rates and income growth expectations. In this section we investigate whether this 
proposition is supported by an empirical investigation of the responsiveness of real house 
prices to real interest rates and stock market returns across our sample of European countries. 
Given the requirement that under a single European currency all member states conform to a 
common monetary policy, the relationship between house prices and interest rates is of 
critical importance in understanding the consequences for the transmission mechanisms 
between monetary policy and the personal sector. In the UK a substantial proportion of 
housing mortgage repayments are adjusted along with movements in short-term interest rates, 
in other countries mortgage interest rates are often fixed for a long period of time or revised 
infrequently. In some countries, especially the UK, households can often obtain new 
mortgages at interest rates that are fixed for periods of between one and five years. The rates 
at which these are fixed often reflect movements in long-run forward interest rates. Any 
difference in the relationship between the effects of short and long interest rates on house 
prices is therefore of interest. 
 
 Ideally we might wish to construct a full-scale dynamic econometric model of the 
determination of house prices in each country in order to assess the impact of different 
candidate explanatory variables (see Hendry 1984 for the UK, Hort 1998 for Sweden). Given 
the lack of availability of data at a level of frequency below the annual for several of the 
countries in our sample, and the lack of any data prior to 1972 for several countries, this is 
not possible. So to determine the size and significance of any relationship Granger-causality 
tests were carried out between real house prices and key variables – namely interest rates and 
wealth expectations. As in nearly all cases the variables are non-stationary, models are 
estimated in first-differenced form with the inclusion of an error-correction term. This allows 
us to identify both long- and short-run aspects of Granger-causality (Masih and Masih 1996). 
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Whilst the use of an appropriate F-test for the significance of the independent variables 
provides evidence of short-run Granger-causality, the significance of the error correction term 
indicates whether there is any long-run association, as well as indicating whether the two 
variables are cointegrated (Bannerjee et al. 1993). 
 
 Phillips-Perron tests for real short-term interest rates (RS) and real long-term interest 
rates (RL) are reported in Table 7.7 Tables 8 and 9 report results of the Granger-causality 
tests for the relationship between real house prices and the short and long rates respectively. 
The Phillips-Perron unit root tests reveal that the real interest rates series are I(1), except in 
the case of the German rates and in the case of Italian short rates which appear to be I(0). In 
the latter cases, whilst real house prices are in first differences, the real interest rate is in 
levels with the consequence that only short-run casuality is investigated. The Akaike criterion 
is used to determine the lag length for the Granger-causality tests – in general it supports the 
inclusion of only one lag. In addition each of the regressions were checked to ensure residuals 
are white noise, and where evidence of serial correction was found an additional lag was 
included. To test for Granger-causality the F-statistic is reported, given its better small 
sample properties. The first statistic reported refers to the case where an error correction term 
is included; the second refers, in the case where the error correction term is not significant, to 
where it is excluded. In general the two test statistics tend to support the same conclusions.  
 
 In both cases we find strong evidence for long run Granger-causality running from 
real interest rates to real house prices. In the German case, where no error correction term is 
used, we find significant short run Granger-causality from both real interest rates to real 
house prices. The sign of the effect is negative. As far as evidence for the reverse direction 
                                                          
7 These variables are not expressed in logarithms as they may take a negative value. 
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from real house prices to real interest rates is concerned the results are much less conclusive. 
Granger-causality with short interest rates is only found for Ireland. For long interest rates we 
find Granger-causality in this direction for Ireland and for the UK, although in the latter case 
this negative association is a short-run rather than a long-run phenomenon 
 
 These results offer some support for the hypothesis that in countries such as the UK 
and Ireland, where home ownership and mortgage debt levels are high, their respective 
monetary policy has been conducted with a much closer eye on the state of the housing 
market. On the other hand in continental Europe, where home ownership rates tend to be 
lower and the availability of housing finance more tightly regulated, past activity in the 
housing market appears to have no effect on interest rate setting. However our results do 
suggest that in the long-run real house price movements are associated with past real interest 
rate movements throughout those European economies in our sample. 
 
 Table 10 reports Granger-causality test results for real house prices and the real stock 
market index (RM). The real stock market index is used as an indicator of wealth and 
therefore expectations about future income streams. In addition to this in more deregulated 
financial systems where owner-occupation rates are higher, such as in Ireland, Finland and 
the UK, we might expect to observe a much stronger association between housing market 
activity and the stock market. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly direct and 
indirect household gains in the stock market might be higher through personal stock holding 
(as a result for example of privatisation “windfalls”) or through pension fund holdings. Stock 
market gains may stimulate portfolio adjustment as households use those gains to finance 
house purchasing. Secondly in the UK housing finance products were until the 1990s 
increasingly stock market linked through the sale of “endowment” mortgages where 
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repayment of the mortgage principal is through a fund whose performance is linked to stock 
market performance. 
 
 The results reported to some extent bear these predictions out. The table provides 
evidence of Granger-causality from house prices to stock market returns Ireland, Sweden and 
the UK, as well as for Germany. The association is strongest in the UK and Germany where 
stock markets are largest and most developed. The sign of the association is negative 
consistent with portfolio adjustment effects. For Finland we find significant evidence for 
Granger-causality running from real house prices to stock market returns, with a positive 
association between the two. This is consistent with a feedback association between the 
housing market and financial assets perhaps working through the impact of housing buoyancy 
on the construction and consumer durables’ sectors. The linkage between consumer spending 
(or its converse personal sector saving) and the housing market has been discussed elsewhere 
particularly in the UK context.8 We turn to a further examination of this issue on the next 
section. 
 
5. Real House Prices and Consumer Spending Activity 
 
  The relationship between housing wealth and household consumer expenditure has 
subject to considerable discussion in those countries, such as the UK, where housing market 
boom-bust cycles have fed into firstly rapid increases in consumer spending and subsequently 
saving in order to reduce a later “debt overhang” problem. The key institutional linkage is 
generally regarded as financial liberalisation, which has increased the “fungibility” of 
                                                          
8 Carruth and Henley (1992) report evidence in the UK context for a strong relationship 
between the housing market and consumer durables spending. See other references in 
footnote 2. 
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housing wealth. Increased ability to borrow for house purchase and remortgage to release 
subsequent housing equity gains has increased the sensitivity of consumer spending and 
saving to house price movements. Within the context of ideas concerning life-cycle 
consumption behaviour financial liberalisation may have profound implications for the timing 
of consumption and saving. This is also true to the extent that some households may (possibly 
mistakenly) regard appreciation of house values as reflecting permanent wealth increases 
offering a permanent increase in consumption opportunities (Attansio and Weber 1994). 
Kennedy and Andersen (1994) in an earlier study find considerable diversity across European 
countries in the effects of housing wealth on savings behaviour spanning both a positive and 
a negative relationship. Carruth et al. (1999) could find no evidence for a common 
consumption function across 15 EU countries (although data limitations prevented them from 
directly including controls for housing and other forms of personal wealth). 
 
 Here we repeat the approach of the previous section by looking for Granger-causality 
effects between real house prices and real consumer spending. Table 11 reports Phillips-
Perron unit root tests to establish the order of integration of real consumer spending. For the 
sample period in question the test results establish that spending is I(1) in all cases except the 
Netherlands and Italy where it appears to be I(0). In the latter cases, therefore, we investigate 
the relationship between the growth in real house prices and the level of real consumer 
spending. Table 12 reports the Granger-causality test results, along with error correction 
coefficients. We find significant evidence of long-run bi-Granger-causality for the two 
countries with the strongest cycle in real house prices in the 1980s, namely Finland and the 
UK. In addition to this the table shows evidence of short-run Granger-causality from real 
consumer spending to real house prices for Ireland. Thus where owner-occupation rates are 
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highest and real house prices most cyclically volatile we find the stronger evidence of an 
association between total personal sector spending activity and the housing market. 
 
6. Assessment and Conclusions 
 
 Across the European Union there exists a substantial diversity in the degree and 
extent to which national governments intervene in the housing market. There are differences 
in the tax treatment of mortgage interest payments and in housing capital gains, differences to 
which housing finance regulation imposes credit and down-payment constraints on home-
buyers, differences in the degree of competition in the provision of mortgage products and 
differences in the way in which other forms of housing tenure are favoured/disadvantaged 
relative to owner-occupation. We find little evidence to suggest any process of strong 
convergence in housing finance institutional arrangements. On the contrary, to the extent that 
countries such as the UK have engaged on a process of deregulation over the last twenty 
years while others, most notably Germany, have undertaken no such process, available 
evidence suggests divergence rather than convergence. Consequently substantial differences 
in the structure of housing tenure (between owner-occupation, private forms of tenure and 
state provision of social housing) exist and persist. It is perhaps rather surprising therefore 
that there has been little or no discussion at either the levels of economic analysis or of 
policy-making of the implications of this state of affairs for the process of monetary 
integration. Furthermore we are aware of no international comparative attempts at any form 
of cost-benefit analysis of the different forms of housing finance/housing provision 
regulation. 
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 Although there is some evidence for a common house price cycle across the countries 
we examine, it is rather weak. Given the discussion above concerning the institutional and 
regulatory background, we should not be surprised by this. There are considerable differences 
in the amplitude of the cycle across countries, ranging from Finland, UK and Italy where the 
cycle is very strong to Germany where the degree of cyclicality is very much less. At the time 
of writing both Finland and Ireland are experiencing very rapid real house price growth 
particularly around their capital cities, and there is growing evidence of rapid real house price 
growth re-emerging in the South East of the UK. 
 
 Formal econometric evidence for correlation and convergence supports these 
conclusions. Cointegration analysis suggests some support for real house price convergence 
within some of those countries now in the EMU (Germany, Ireland, Italy and the 
Netherlands). Time-varying parameter (Kalman Filter) analysis suggests the same 
convergence “club”, although with Ireland starting to drift away very recently. This analysis 
suggests that real house prices in Finland and the UK are closer to each other than to the rest 
of Europe – consistent with their shared experience of a recent boom-bust housing market 
cycle. 
 
 In all the countries we examine we find evidence of a long-run relationship between 
real interest rates and real house prices with long-run Granger-causality running from interest 
rates to house prices. Movements in monetary policy feed through to real house prices, if not 
in the short-run then certainly in the long-run. However only in the cases of the UK and 
Ireland do we find evidence that the past real house price growth influences the monetary 
policy “reaction function”. This suggests that, in the UK context of high level of owner-
occupation and deregulated provision of housing finance, monetary policy is sensitive to the 
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state of the housing market. At the time of writing this is apparent in the Bank of England’s 
Monetary Policy Committee recent decision to raise short-term interest rates, widening the 
gap between UK and Euro-zone nominal rates despite low UK consumer price inflation, 
because of concerns about accelerating house prices. 
 
 Volatile housing markets and house prices would not necessarily in themselves be a 
cause for concern about economic performance, unless there is evidence of transmission 
mechanisms between the housing market and the wider economy. At a less direct level, but 
beyond the scope of the present paper, might be supply-side concerns about the impact of 
house price volatility and intra-European divergence of house prices on labour mobility. 
Inter-regional mobility rates are very low in Europe compared to within the United States. If 
labour mobility is perceived as a potentially important mechanism for smoothing 
unemployment disparities across Europe then real house price divergence (as well as high 
housing market transactions costs) may hinder the operation of that mechanism. A more 
direct connection between the housing market and macro-economic activity is likely to arise 
through the potential effects of real appreciation of housing assets on perceived levels of 
permanent income and thus on consumer spending. This is an issue which has already 
generated a fair volume of research in the UK context, but rather less elsewhere in Europe. 
The results in this paper offer some explanation for this – only in the UK and Finland do we 
find significant Granger-causal links from real house prices to real consumer spending. It is 
perhaps not surprising that these two economies are amongst those with the most volatile 
housing markets in Europe. 
 
 What are the implications for economic and monetary union in Europe? Our findings 
would suggest that those smaller European economies, such as Ireland or Finland, where 
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owner-occupation rates are high and housing finance systems largely deregulated are likely to 
experience considerable further house price volatility under a current regime of low real and 
nominal interest rates. This will present problems for macroeconomic management to the 
extent that rapid appreciation of housing assets fuels shifting perceptions about permanent 
income, leading to pressure for either increased regulation and control over housing finance 
or (politically problematic) fiscal measures to dampen domestic consumer demand. For the 
UK which is not yet a member of the single European currency, future membership is likely 
to lead to similar difficulties. At present the monetary authorities of the Bank of England can 
and do exercise the option to use monetary to anticipate potential house price volatility. This 
is largely as a result of an acknowledgement, based on the experience of the second half of 
the 1980s and early 1990s, that an asset bubble in the housing market can, if unchecked by 
other policy correctives, lead to significant inflationary pressure. The UK will be a larger 
player within EMU than an Ireland or a Finland, and housing market fuelled inflationary 
pressure within the UK economy and its potential spillovers elsewhere in the Euro-zone may 
figure rather more significantly in the European Central Bank welfare function. However 
future membership of EMU will inevitably restrict the room for policy manoeuvre leading to 
pressure to re-establish mechanisms for more effective regulation in the provision of housing 
finance. A process of institutional convergence will inevitably be set in train. How long that 
process will take is a matter of considerable speculation. 
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Appendix: Data Definitions and Sources 
 
House prices 
 
Italy: National average prices of new and renovated houses in large and mid-size cities, 
source: Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali (CENSIS), Annual Reports. 
  
Germany: Average market price of detached and terraced houses sold with vacant possession, 
source: Ring Deutscher Makler (German Real Estate Brokers Association). (See Holmans 
(1994) for further details). 
 
Netherlands: (up to 1977) Offical average house price index, source: Maandstatistiek 
Bouwnijverheld, June 1986. (1978- ) average house prices, source: Onderzoek 
Prijsontwikkling Particuliere Woningen, Netherland Central Bureau of Statistics. (See 
Holmans (1994) for further details). 
 
UK: Average price of new dwellings on which mortgages have been approved, source: Office 
for National Statistics, Economic Trends Annual Supplement. 
 
Finland: Average price for apartments and terraced homes, as recorded by the Real Estate 
Agents Association and the Bank of Finland. 
 
Sweden: Index based on owner occupied one and two-dwelling buildings, based on reports of 
title registrations. 
 
Ireland: Average price of new and second hand homes, source: Irish Central Statistical 
Office. 
 
 
Consumer Spending 
 
Real consumer spending, source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, except Finland, Ireland 
and Sweden, source: IMF International Financial Statistics, all via Datastream. 
 
Output 
 
Real GDP, source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, except Finland, source: National 
Accounts, and Ireland and Sweden, source IMF International Financial Statistics, all via 
Datastream 
 
Stock Prices 
 
Main national stock market return index, including both capital gains and dividends, source 
Datastream. 
  
Real Interest Rates (Short) 
 
Defined as rt – (pt+1 – pt)/pt where r is the short term nominal interest rate and p the consumer 
price index. Short interest rate: 3 month treasury bill rate except Finland, official discount 
rate; source OECD Main Economic Indicators, via Datastream. 
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Real Interest Rates (Long) 
 
Defined as rt – (pt+1 – pt)/pt where r is the long term nominal interest rate and p the consumer 
price index. Long interest rate: Return on long-term government bonds; source Datastream. 
 
Consumer price index, source OECD Main Economic Indicators, via Datastream. 
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Table 1: Housing Finance Systems across the EU 
Country (1) 
Owner-
Occupation 
Rate1 
(2) 
Private Rental 
Occupation 
Rate 
(3) 
Tax 
Deductability 
of Mortgage 
Payments 
(4) 
Tax Treatment 
of Capital Gains 
and Imputed 
Rental Income 
(5) 
Loan to 
Value Ratios 
(per cent)3 
(6) 
Typical home 
loan maturity 
(7) 
State Intervention 
in Private Rental 
Sector 
Austria 41/55 22 none CGT exempt 
over 10 years 
80 12 years5 Rent regulation 
Belgium 62 30 TA (DC) CGT exempt, 
IRIT with 
12.5% credit  
80 15-20 years Rent regulation 
Denmark 50/58 24 TA CGT exempt 65 (80) 30 years Rent regulation 
Finland 72/75 11 TA (C) CGT exempt 
over 2 years 
80 15 years Subsidised loans; 
CGT exempt 
France 54/62 21 TA for 5 years CGT exempt but 
wealth tax over 
FF4.16m 
60 (60) 15 years Largely 
unregulated 
Germany 38 36 None CGT exempt 50 (60) 12 years5 Rent and loan 
subsidies 
Ireland 80 9 TA (C) CGT exempt 65  Landlord tax relief 
Italy 67/86 8 TA (C) CGT exempt 
over 5 years 
504 (75) 10-25 years Part regulated 
Netherlands 47 17 TA 1.8% IRIT; 
CGT exempt 
 30 years Rent regulation6; 
GCT exempt 
Spain 76 16 TA on interest 
and principal 
CGT exempt if 
reinvested and 
2% IRIT 
80 15 years Rent regulation6; 
Subsidised loans 
Sweden 43/62 16 TA CGT exempt but 
wealth tax over 
SK800k 
50 (75) 20-30 years Rent regulation6; 
Subsidised loans 
UK 66 10 TA (C) CGT exempt 75 25 years Limited landlord 
tax incentives 
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Key:  TA – tax allowance; (C) – up to ceiling;  (DC) – up to ceiling which declines over mortgage term; 
  GCT – capital gains taxation; IRIT – imputed rental income taxation 
Notes: 1. higher number includes co-ownership and cooperative ownership; 2. West Germany; 3. Average advances; statutory maximum 
in brackets; 4. with mortgage queuing; 5. Typical Bausparkassen advance, longer terms possible from mortgage bond funds; 6. 
Recent relaxation in the severity of regulation 
Sources: (1), (2)  Balchin (1996), data refer to 1995 
  (3) Kennedy and Andersen (1994), data refer to 1992, supplemented by information from Balchin (1996) 
  (4) Price Waterhouse Coopers (1996) 
(5) and (6) Kennedy and Andersen (1994); data refer to 1992 supplemented by information from Bank of England (1991); 
Balchin (1996); and Freeman (1997). 
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Table 2: Real House Price Cycles in EU Economies 
 
Year Germany Netherlands Italy Sweden Finland UK Ireland 
1973   T (-8% p.a.)  P (+13% p.a.) P (+22% p.a.) T (-2% p.a.) 
1974        
1975 T (-5% p.a.)  P (+30% p.a.) P (+10 % p.a.) T (-11% p.a.) T (-14% p.a.)  
1976   T (-8% p.a.)     
1977  P (+22% p.a.)      
1978       P (+18% p.a.) 
1979 P (+9% p.a.)     P (+12% p.a.)  
1980    T (-13% p.a.)    
1981  T (-21% p.a.) P (+18% p.a.)   T (-8% p.a.)  
1982   T (-15% p.a.)    T (-9% p.a.) 
1983     P (+10% p.a.)   
1984        
1985 T (-7% p.a.)    T (-1% p.a.)   
1986        
1987        
1988    P (+12% p.a.) P (+27% p.a.) P (+19% p.a.)  
1989   P (+20% p.a.)     
1990       P (+9% p.a.) 
1991      T (-8% p.a.) T (-1% p.a.) 
1992  P (+10% p.a.)  T (-22% p.a.) T (-22% p.a.)   
1993   T (-17% p.a.)     
1994 P (+6% p.a.)       
 
Notes: P = peak; T = trough 
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Table 3: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests for Real House Prices 
 
Country log HP ∆ log HP 
Finland 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Italy** 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
UK 
-1.897 
-1.887 
-0.079 
-2.996 
-2.789 
-1.238 
-1.867 
-1.983 
-5.408 
-2.784 
-2.625 
-4.279 
-3.829 
-3.401 
-3.062 
-3.787 
 
Notes:  Critical values –3.00 (5%), -2.63 (10%). 
 Test statistics calculated in each case using 5 Newey-West lags and Bartlett weights. 
 Sample period: 1970-1997, except Germany 1972-1997 
 ** denotes smoothed series using 3 year moving average. 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix for ∆ log HP 
 
Country Fn Ge Ir It Ne Sw UK 
Finland 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Nether. 
Sweden 
UK 
1.000 
 
-0.152 
1.000 
 
0.040 
0.298 
1.000 
 
 
-0.072 
0.134 
0.163 
1.000 
 
 
 
-0.229 
0.040 
0.445 
-0.220 
1.000 
0.185 
0.040 
0.515 
0.210 
0.558 
1.000 
0.596 
0.202 
0.162 
-0.290 
0.091 
0.336 
1.000 
 
Sample period: 1972-97 
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Table 5: Engle-Granger Tests for Bivariate Cointegration 
Country UK Finland  Ireland Italy Netherlands Sweden 
Germany 
UK 
Finland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
-2.610 -2.753 
-3.746 
 
-3.464 
-2.280 
-2.963 
 
-3.980 
-4.128 
-3.245 
-1.536 
-4.087 
-3.041 
-2.970 
-2.431 
-3.746 
-2.945 
-2.880 
-3.516 
-1.353 
-3.733 
-2.652 
 
Notes:  Critical values -3.60 (5%), -3.24 (10%) 
 The order of the autoregressive process was chosen by reference to the Akaike 
Information criterion – in most cases it is one. 
 Sample period: 1970-1997, except tests with Germany 1972-1997 
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Table 6: Phillips-Hansen Estimates of Bivariate Cointegrating Relationships 
 
 Coefficient 
Dep. Variable:  
log HP 
α βUK α βGermany α βFinland 
Germany  
 
 
Finland 
 
 
Ireland 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
Nether. 
 
 
Sweden 
-0.646 
(0.758) 
 
-1.883 
(1.757) 
 
4.457 
(4.254) 
 
0.800 
(0.859) 
 
5.179 
(4.227) 
 
5.421 
(5.924) 
0.233 
(1.739) 
 
0.430 
(2.547) 
 
0.277 
(1.677) 
 
0.254 
(1.767) 
 
-0.041 
(0.212) 
 
-0.085 
(0.588) 
 
 
 
1.130 
(2.188) 
 
5.247 
(54.796) 
 
1.831 
(8.210) 
 
4.332 
(11.612) 
 
4.770 
(18.506) 
 
 
 
-0.313 
(0.501) 
 
1.157 
(10.009) 
 
0.713 
(2.647) 
 
0.641 
(1.421) 
 
0.064 
(0.204) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.262 
(35.488) 
 
2.345 
(14.463) 
 
5.322 
(37.804) 
 
5.016 
(46.930) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.075 
(0.378) 
 
0.110 
(0.603) 
 
-0.499 
(3.160) 
 
-0.175 
(1.464) 
 
 
 Coefficient 
Dep. Variable:  
log HP 
α βIreland α βItaly α βNetherlands 
Italy 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
 
Sweden 
 
-0.327 
(0.221) 
 
0.878 
(0.453) 
 
4.346 
(2.647) 
0.445 
(1.858) 
 
0.643 
(2.053) 
 
0.078 
(0.295) 
 
 
 
4.993 
(5.880) 
 
4.563 
(7.695) 
 
 
 
-0.045 
(0.129) 
 
0.118 
(0.483) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.691 
(5.288) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.441 
(4.234) 
 
Notes:  T-statistics in parentheses 
 Estimations in all cases use 5 Newey-West lags and Bartlett weights. 
 Sample period: 1970-1997, except tests with Germany 1972-1997 
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Table 7: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests for Real Interest Rates and Stock Market 
Return 
 
Country RS ∆ RS RL ∆ RL log RM ∆ log RM 
Germany 
Finland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
UK 
-3.525 
-1.983 
-2.017 
-3.318 
-1.378 
-2.795 
-2.029 
 
-6.229 
-6.935 
 
-7.520 
-12.380 
-12.527 
-4.340 
n.a. 
-2.221 
-2.200 
-1.449 
-2.380 
-2.354 
 
n.a. 
-6.058 
-7.079 
-6.029 
-14.783 
-8.375 
0.471 
-0.327 
0.800 
-0.949 
2.076 
0.421 
1.243 
-6.056 
-6.440 
-11.715 
-5.957 
-5.279 
-6.430 
-5.611 
 
Notes:  Critical values –3.00 (5%), -2.63 (10%). 
 Test statistics calculated in each case using 5 Newey-West lags and Bartlett weights. 
 Sample period: 1970-1997, except Germany 1972-1997 
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Table 8: Granger Causality Tests for Real House Prices and Real Short Interest Rates 
 
 log HP ⇒  RS RS ⇒  log HP 
Country 
 
F-stat 
(1) 
ect 
(t-stat) 
F-stat 
(2) 
F-stat 
(1) 
ect  
(t-stat) 
Germany 
 
Finland 
 
 
Ireland 
 
 
Italy 
 
Netherlands 
 
 
Sweden 
 
 
UK 
 
0.505 (+) 
 
0.512 (+) 
 
 
1.752 (-) 
 
 
0.140 (+) 
 
0.053 (+) 
 
 
1.869 (-) 
 
 
1.499 (-) 
 
 
-0.036 
(1.345) 
 
-0.107* 
(1.756) 
 
 
 
-0.019 
(0.862) 
 
-0.018 
(0.393) 
 
-0.017 
(0.470) 
 
 
 
1.715 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.616 
 
 
2.196 
 
 
1.515 
9.155** (-) 
 
1.927 (-) 
 
 
0.004 (+) 
 
 
1.759 (-) 
 
0.232 (+) 
 
 
2.431 (+) 
 
 
0.809 (-) 
 
 
-0.327** 
(4.889) 
 
-0.224** 
(2.778) 
 
 
 
-0.208** 
(3.065) 
 
-0.197** 
(4.268) 
 
-0.160** 
(2.429) 
 
Notes: ect = error correction term coefficient, (log(HP)-RS)t-1 , with associated t-statistic in 
parentheses. F-stat (1) is the Granger causality test with the inclusion of the error 
correction term; F-stat (2) is that with it omitted.  
** and * denote significance at 5% and 10% respectively.  
(+) and (-) indicate the sign of the (summed) coefficients on the explanatory variable 
lags. 
 Sample period: 1970-1997, except Germany 1972-1997 
 
The Ireland test includes the dummy, taking the value 0 until 1994 and 1 thereafter. A 
dummy variable was included in the Sweden, Finland and UK regressions, where 
causality runs from both short and long-term interest rates to house prices. The 
dummies are for 1988 (Finland), 1975 (Sweden) and 1974 (UK), coinciding with 
excess volatility in the housing market. 
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Table 9: Granger Causality Tests for Real House Prices and Real Long Interest Rates 
 
 log HP ⇒  RL RL ⇒  log HP 
Country 
 
F-stat 
(1) 
ect 
(t-stat) 
F-stat 
(2) 
F-stat 
(1) 
ect  
(t-stat) 
Germany 
 
Ireland 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
 
Sweden 
 
 
UK 
 
0.292 (+) 
 
3.767* (-) 
 
 
0.116 (+) 
 
 
1.361 (-) 
 
 
2.641 (-) 
 
 
4.406** (-) 
 
 
-0.098* 
(1.922) 
 
-0.072 
(1.343) 
 
-0.171 
(1.138) 
 
-0.049 
(1.257) 
 
-0.034 
(1.034) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.599 
 
 
0.769 
 
 
1.865 
 
 
4.438** 
 
4.520** (-) 
 
0.750 (+) 
 
 
0.150 (-) 
 
 
3.136* (+) 
 
 
4.504** (+) 
 
 
0.314 (+) 
 
 
-0.232** 
(3.116) 
 
-0.323** 
(2.096) 
 
-0.224** 
(3.675) 
 
-0.190** 
(4.370) 
 
-0.121* 
(1.722) 
 
Notes:  see Table 8. 
 ect = (log(HP)-RL)t-1 
 No consistently defined long-run rate of interest is available for Finland over the 
sample period. 
 Sample period: 1970-1997, except Germany 1972-1997 
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Table 10: Granger Causality Tests for Real House Prices and Real Stock Market 
Indices 
 
 log HP ⇒  log RM log RM ⇒  log HP 
Country 
 
F-stat 
(1) 
ect 
(t-stat) 
F-stat 
(2) 
F-stat 
(1) 
ect  
(t-stat) 
F-stat 
(2) 
Germany 
 
 
Finland 
 
 
Ireland 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
 
Sweden 
 
 
UK 
 
7.952** (-) 
 
 
1.079 (-) 
 
 
2.927* (-) 
 
 
2.054 (-) 
 
 
1.314 (-) 
 
 
4.117* (-) 
 
 
8.676** (-) 
0.011 
(0.192) 
 
0.018 
(0.177) 
 
0.030 
(0.338) 
 
-0.097 
(1.019) 
 
0.053 
(1.344) 
 
0.084 
(1.255) 
 
0.058 
(0.975) 
8.467** 
 
 
1.624 
 
 
2.959* 
 
 
1.568 
 
 
0.794 
 
 
3.394* 
 
 
8.292** 
0.047 (+) 
 
 
9.127** (+) 
 
 
1.295 (+) 
 
 
0.008 (+) 
 
 
1.691 (-) 
 
 
0.361 (+) 
 
 
1.604 (+) 
-0.021 
(1.211) 
 
0.009 
(0.457) 
 
-0.006 
(0.279) 
 
-0.033 
(0.795) 
 
-0.025 
(1.569) 
 
-0.017 
(1.121) 
 
0.007 
(0.237) 
 
0.498 
 
 
9.526** 
 
 
1.847 
 
 
0.102 
 
 
0.785 
 
 
0.519 
 
 
2.045 
 
Notes:  see Table 8. 
 ect = (log(HP)-log(RM))t-1 
 Sample period: 1970-1997, except Germany 1972-1997 
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Table 11: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests for Real Consumer Spending 
 
Country log C ∆ log C 
Germany 
Finland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
UK 
-0.168 
-1.697 
0.075 
-3.861 
-7.385 
-1.583 
-0.002 
-3.137 
-5.673 
-7.213 
 
 
-7.281 
-5.311 
 
Notes:  Critical values –3.00 (5%), -2.63 (10%). 
 Test statistics calculated in each case using 5 Newey-West lags and Bartlett weights. 
 Sample period: 1970-1997, except Germany 1972-1997 
 
 
Table 12: Granger Causality Tests for Real House Prices and Real Consumer Spending 
 
 log HP ⇒  log C log C ⇒  log HP 
Country 
 
F-stat 
(1) 
ect 
(t-stat) 
F-stat 
(2) 
F-stat 
(1) 
ect  
(t-stat) 
F-stat 
(2) 
Germany 
 
 
Finland 
 
 
Ireland 
 
 
Italy 
 
Netherlands 
 
Sweden 
 
 
UK 
 
1.930 (-) 
 
 
0.166 (+) 
 
 
0.210 (+) 
 
 
0.728 (-) 
 
0.593 (+) 
 
0.068 (-) 
 
 
0.494 (+) 
0.008 
(0.416) 
 
0.053** 
(2.605) 
 
0.049 
(0.210) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.003 
(0.126) 
 
0.188** 
(4.062) 
1.975 
 
 
 
 
 
0.107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.073 
 
 
 
0.402 (+) 
 
 
8.962** (+) 
 
 
3.196* (+) 
 
 
0.175 (-) 
 
1.334 (-) 
 
1.330 (+) 
 
 
0.076 (+) 
 
-0.086 
(1.645) 
 
-0.329** 
(4.271) 
 
-0.057 
(0.933) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.077 
(1.561) 
 
-0.640** 
(3.976) 
 
1.642 
 
 
 
 
 
4.249* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.377 
 
 
Notes: see Table 8. 
 The German test includes a intercept dummy variable for German re-unification in 
1991. 
 Sample period: 1970-1997, except Germany 1972-1997 
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Figure 1: Real House Price Growth 1973 to 1997 
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Figure 2: Kalman Filter Convergence Estimates 
 
Note: estimation sample period 1972-1997  
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